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THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES
In a recent decision I the United States Supreme Court has
denied to a state the power to regulate the fees of private em-
ployment agencies. The state of New Jersey had passed an act
providing that an applicant for a license to conduct an employ-
ment agency, in addition to other requirements, must "file w.ith
the Commissioner of Labor, for his approval, a schedule of fees
proposed to be charged for any service rendered to employers
seeking employees, and persons seeking employment, and all
charges must conform thereto." 2 Under this section the Com-
IRibnik v. McBride, 48 Sup. Ct. 614 (U. S. 1928).
2 N. J. Laws 1918, c. 227.
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missioner of Labor refused to issue a license to Ribnik because
"the fees proposed to be charged ... were excessive and unrea-
sonable." The Supreme Court of the state, called upon to re-
view the denial of application, upheld the action of the Commis-
sioner,3 and was in turn sustained by the state Court of Errors
and Appeals.
4
This judgment has now been reversed by the United States
Supreme Court. It has found that the disputed section of the
statute confers upon the Commissioner the power "to fix prices"
in "a business ... not affected with a public interest," and hence
to amount to "a deprivation of property" without "due process
of law." The decision of the court was announced by Justice
Sutherland, in whose opinion Chief Justice Taft, Justices Mc-
Reynolds and Butler joined. In a separate statement, Justice
Sanford "concurred in the result.., upon the controlling author-
ity" of the theatre-ticket case,5 which he was "unable to dis-
tinguish." A vigorous dissent was read by Justice Stone, in
which Justices Holmes and Brandeis joined.
This decision places in more or less peril the whole body of
legislation which has been gradually built up for the regula-
tion of "labor exchanges." The subject attracted the attention
of law-makers as early as the nineties; during more than three
decades statute has been added to statute; and at present the
national government, most of the states of the union, and many
municipalities subject employment agencies to formal control.
Since the supervision of fees may take many different forms,
and since in different enactments it is more or less insepara-
ble from other provisions, it would take a detailed analysis of
statutes to determine the extent of invalidity that follows in
the wake of the decision. The court did not regard "the mere
existence in other states of statutory provisions like the one
now under review as entitled to persuasive force." Yet, al-
though it defies accurate statement, a review of the movement
for regulation will indicate something of the far-reaching sig-
nificance of its declaration of unconstitutionality.
The need for a control of "the labor market" has come with
an advance of industrialism. Until well in the nineteenth cen-
tury production was carried on in small shops, goods were sold
in a market near at hand, and each town with its bit of sur-
rounding country was an almost self-contained industrial unit.
Even as late as the eighties the nation was largely agricultural,
business was little beyond the stage of petty trade, and all
goods except a few "cash" staples were produced for local con-
sumption. Under these conditions there was, save in name,
34 N. T. lisc. 623 (1926).
4 137 AtI. 437 (N. J. L. 1927).
5 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
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hardly such a thing as "a labor market." In the country or
the small town, where everything was a matter of neighborhood
knowledge, the jobs open and the laborers available were matters
of common knowledge, and the two were brought together with-
out difficulty. It was only in the city, which was still new and
strange, that the problem of "hiring" did not solve itself and
there was need for the service of brokers in human labor.
But, as with other things which are extensively bought and
sold, in time there arose a "labor market." The coming of the
machine, large-scale production, and the business corporation
have put the prospective employer and the would-be employee
out of touch with each other. The old self-contained community
of many trades has ceased to be; each business has become a
great industry localized in a few places, selling its product to
the whole nation; and these businesses have been articulated
into a gigantic industrial machine. With these changes the
filling of places with laborers has ceased to be a personal and
a local affair. The making of the best possible adjustment be-
tween the laborers of a nation and the jobs of a great industrial
system has become a problem of the first magnitude.
This adjustment of men to jobs is always going on and is
never ended. Its solution must make the best terms it can
with many forces tending to upset the balance. As old workers
die or retire they must be replaced by new ones; as occupations
become seasonal, the laborer who would live the year round must
rely on two or more of them; as technology robs experienced
workers of their skill, they must seek employment in lines new
to them; with the passing of old trades, the rise in new ones,
the shift of industries from one section of the country to an-
other; and the ebb and flow of prosperity which we call "the
business cycle," the supply of labor has to be adjusted to an
ever-changing demand for it. Always, everywhere, a surplus of
jobs attracts men, a surplus of laborers has to be crowded into
such jobs as can be found. In town, in a trade, in an industry,
throughout the country at large, by myriad separate acts of
employment, men and jobs must be organized into a going pro-
ductive system.
In the maintenance of a mechanism adequate to the task of
organization, all the parties to industry have a stake. The busi-
ness man demands an adequate supply of labor adapted to his
requirements. The laborer demands a job which is at once -t
protection against unemployment and a chance to earn a living.
The public has an interest in the increase of wealth which must
attend full employment, in avoiding the cost of relieving poverty
whose chief modern source is a lack of available work, and in
the higher living standards and the richer opportunities at life
which come from the fullest utilization of human resources.
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Nor has there been any lack of appreciation of the importance
of the problem by business men, by laborers, and by the public.
The business corporations have in increasing number established
"employment divisions" and "bureaus of personnel," to go out
and find suitable laborers, and to convert them into the trained
workmen they demand. The workers themselves have sought
to guard against the dangers which lie in making of human labor
"a marketable commodity," their attempt to exercise a construc-
tive control over "hiring and firing" is one of the most important
chapters in trade-union history. And with the growing import-
ance of the problem and with increasing evidence that matters
cannot take care of themselves, the public has come to take a
hand in the matter.
The interest of the state has been manifest in a number of
ways. As was inevitable for a time the organization of employ-
ment was left to whom it might concern. Private persons were
free to undertake for a price to find men for jobs and jobs for
men. Agencies came into existence for the placement of men
of almost every trade from the least to the most highly skilled,
and these exchanges came to constitute a very loosely organized
"national labor market." Later, as abuses became matters of
common knowledge, the federal government, various states, and
not a few municipal councils directed inquiries into their ade-
quacy for the task, the competence of their performance, and
the fairness of their practices to those who used their services.
It was discovered, with a unanimity that is rare in such matters,
that private exchanges are unable to handle in a comprehensive
and constructive way the placement of labor, and that the abuses
which attend the unregulated exchange are seemingly insepar-
able from its operation.6 The information about "laborers
wanted" has not been reliable; men have repeatedly been sent
in search of jobs which did not exist. There is a continued story
of collusion between foremen and agencies by which the former
created vacancies and the latter passed over part of the fees
collected for filling them. In his opinion Justice Stone mentions
"the three gang system ;" one gang just discharged is on its way
home; a second is for the moment employed; a third, "hired
by the agency is on its way to the job." The fees charged have
been excessive; far too frequently they have been collected for
6 The earlier investigations are summarized by Justice Brandeis in Adams
v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597-616, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 665-673 (1917), and the
later ones by Justice Stone in his opinion in the case under discussion. See
particularly the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, SEN.
Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Vols. 1 and 2, passim; PROCEEDINGS,
NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION, ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTAL LABOR OrFi-
cIALs (1923). There have also been a number of investigations by research
and social welfare organizations, tl e more important of which are listed
by Justices Brandeis and Stone.
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services which have not been rendered. It is common to exact
different fees of different laborers; the exchanges, instead of
charging fair and reasonable compensation for their services,
graduate their charges to what the several items of traffic can
be made to bear. Often, in times when work is scarce, a monop-
oly price is exacted for a job. The reports agree that excessive
charges and poor service lie at the heart of the problem, and that
they are rooted in a lack of "bargaining power" on the part of
the non-employed.
In course of time these investigations have ripened into legis-
lation. The attempt at governmental supervision had its be-
ginning in the nineties. A "model" act of regulation has been
passed by Congress for the District of Columbia; all but nine
of the states have dealt with the subject by specific statute,8 and
many aldermanic bodies have aimed ordinances at particular
abuses. In some states such provisions as the requirement of
bonds, the demand for certificates of character, and the publica-
tion and filing of schedules of fees are in force; in others a
license is required which is to be had only upon conditions de-
signed to protect patrons. But, because of the character of the
abuses, the dominant form of control is a supervision of the
fees to be charged. Ten states fix specific fees to be charged; 1
ten states limit fees to a percentage of wages; 10 and eight states,
including New Jersey, require the schedule of fees to be ap-
proved by a state official.' The general distrust of private agen-
cies has gone so far that a number of states and many cities have
established public free employment exchanges.12  One state has
by law prohibited private exchanges altogether, 3 and another
734 STAT. 304 (1906).
8 The exceptions are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi,
North Dakota, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Vermont. But it is of
note that in some of these, e. g., Alabama and Florida, general statutes
specifying the conditions under which persons are to be licenscd to engage
in various trades apply to employment agencies.
9 Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Mlaine, Missouri, Montana, Texas,
Virginia and Wyoming. By Act of Congress this is also true of the District
of Columbia.
10 Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Rhode Island.
11 California, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
12 As early as 1912 such offices were maintained by at least fifteen states.
The states are Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, West Virginia and Wisconsin. The state of New York began the
practice as early as 1896. See STATISTICS OF UNEMPLOY ENT AND THIE
WORK OF EmPLOYzMENT OFFICES (U. S. Bureau of Labor, 1913) Bull. No.
109, 35-36.
:13 IDAHo ComP. STAT. (1919) §§ 2297, 2308-2310. Although the statute
would appear to be rendered invalid by the decision in Adams v. Tanner,
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has forbidden agencies to collect fees for service from em-
ployees. 14 Nearly twenty years ago there was a rather wide-
spread demand for "a national clearing house for labor" and
several ambitious schemes were put forward for its realization.
Under the great necessity for "the conservation of labor power"
which the war brought, there was organized "a national system
of labor exchanges." This, it hardly needs to be said, was
scrapped in the general demobilization of industry which fol-
lowed the armistice.
In view of the large volume of legislation, the judicial his-
tory of the regulation of labor exchanges is urprisingly short.
It may be, as Justice Sutherland insists, that many of the stat-
utes have not been enforced; it may be, as Justice Stone is
inclined to think, that their validity has in the past not been
subject to serious question; it is only certain that the dockets
of the courts have known little of the issue. The few state de-
cisions aside,15 only three cases of importance have been before
the United States Supreme Court. In the Michigan case, 0 it
was held to be within "the power of the state to require licenses
for employment agencies and prescribe reasonable regulations
to be enforced by the Commissioner of Labor." In the Wash-
ington case,1 7 a law of the state forbidding an agency to exact
a fee from an employee for service rendered was found invalid.
In the opinion of the court this prohibition deprived the agent
of his chance to earn a livelihood, and hence was a denial of
"a right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way."
Or, as Justice McReynolds, who on that occasion spoke for five
of the nine members of the court, quoted Shylock, "you take
my house when you do take the prop that doth sustain my house."
The court expressly left open the door for "hedging ... this
business about.., by proper regulation." The New Jersey pro-
vision for the supervision of fees is typical of the statutes passed
in twenty-eight states; it is in the judgment of as many state
legislatures the "proper regulation" by which this business
should be hedged about. It is the validity of this form of regu-
lation which is the issue in the Ribnik case.
244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1917), it presumably has not been enforced,
as no case involving its somewhat questionable validity has come before the
courts.
14 Washington. But of. Adams v. Tanner, supra note 13.
Is Since the valfdity of statutes regulating private employment exchanges
must necessarily turn upon constitutional issues, decisions of state courts
holding laws ultra vires are of little account. The decisions of the Califor-
nia court, Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924 (1904), and In re
Smith, 193 Cal. 337, 223 Pac. 971 (1924), declaring state statutes invalid,
which Justice Sutherland cites, can hardly be called authoritative.
16 Brazee v. People, 241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct. 561 (1916).
17 Adams v. Tanner, sitpra note 13.
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The argument by which Justice Sutherland finds the New
Jersey provision unconstitutional is easily stated: his initial com-
mitment is to make the supervision of fees a case of price-fixing.
The core of his argument is a syllogism. The major premise
comes easily; if a business is not "affected with a public inter-
est," the fixing of prices by the state is "a deprivation of prop-
erty" without "due process of law." The minor premise presents
more difficulty and is achieved only through a series of steps.
They are in order: (1) the business of dealing in theatre tickets
has been held to be not "affected with a public interest;" '' (2)
therefore, the work of "a broker, that is of an intermediary" is
not "affected with a public interest;" (3) "the business of secur-
ing employment for those seeking work and employees for those
seeking workers is essentially that of a broker;" and (4) there-
fore, the business of running an employment agency is not
affected with a public interest. The conclusion, of course, fol-
lows: "it is not easy to see how without disregarding that de-
cision, 9 price-fixing legislation in respect of other brokers of
like character can be upheld." Certain of his conclusions, yet
not content, Justice Sutherland adds a more general argument.
The running of an employment agency is of concern "to the
public," but no more so than, the business of "the druggist, the
butcher, the baker, the grocer." It is not such "as to justify
the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its
use thereby, in effect, granted to the public." .1, The interest
of the public is not "that 'public interest' which the law con-
templates as the basis of legislative price control." Here
"granted" and "devoted" and "that public interest" are ulti-
mates. Back of these words the argument does not go; no aids
to recognition are given; no criteria are set down by means of
which these foundations of legislative price-fixing may be found
out when they exist.
If Justice Sutherland's argument is easily stated, it is not
so easily understood. It seems, alike in content and in method,
to raise more questions than it answers. Does such a super-
vision of fees as is provided for in the New Jersey statute
amount to price-fixing regulation? Why is the statute not valid
under the police power, as a regulation properly directed against
a gross and persistent evil whose continued existence is inimical
to the public? Why does the concept of "public interest" have
to be employed to justify governmental interference with price
when it does not have to be used to justify interference with
hours of labor, the methods of wage-payment, and responsibility
Is Tyson v. Banton, supra note 5.
29 The reference is to Tyson v. Banton.
20 Here Justice Sutherland quotes from his opinion in Tyson v. Banton,
supra note 13, at 430, 47 Sup. Ct. at 432.
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for industrial accident? And are not all of these "like terms" of
the same bargain? Is the basis of the concept of "public in-
terest" a dedication and an extraordinary importance of a busi-
ness to the public? Or is it only the need for regulation as
evidenced by (1) the importance of the business to the public,
-and (2) the failure of the competitive system to protect its in-
terest?21 Can a category of public interest be made to per-
form the practical legal task of distinguishing between cases
which invite price-regulation and those which do not? Or, are
not industries so varied in nature, the abuses which attend them
so miscellaneous in kind, and their demands for legislative at-
tention so specific in character that public interest can never be
more than a label to be used in converting the need for regula-
tion into the fact.22
But if Justice Sutherland's employment of "public interest"
is puzzling, his use of the concept "brokers" to complete his
-argument is doubly so. Whence comes his category, all the mem-
bers of which are not affected with a public interest? Is it in-
vented to get the dealer in theatre' tickets and the employment
agent in the same class in order that the same invalidity may
be visited upon statutes regulating them? 23 If the judgment
of the court upon the ticket dealer applies to the class to which
21 If the concept is to be used as a test of the validity of price-fixing
legislation, it must be endowed with a specific meaning. The two criteria
set down in the text seem to be the meaning which careful students ex-
'tract from a study of the cases. See the list in the first paragraph of
'Justice Stone's opinion. It is significant that Justice Stone who dissents and
Mr. Walter Gordon Merritt, of the League for Industrial Rights, who
pleaded the case so successfully for Ribnik, agree on this. Justice Stone
says, "As I read those decisions, such regulation is within a state's power
whenever any combination of circumstances seriously curtails the regula-
tive force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at such a
disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legislature might reason-
ably anticipate serious consequences to the community as a whole." Mr.
Merfitt seems to see how easy it is to "affect" employment agencies with
a "public interest" and to appreciate the weakness of his own case. Ac-
cordingly in his brief he tries to show that the openness of the trade and
*the competition between agencies gives adequate protection against abuses.
The facts were against him; so he does not dwell on them. Instead he does
the best he can by telling how competition is supposed to work. It is
puzzling to know why Justice Sutherland did not avail himself of this
inadequate but rather necessary bit of help. It has been made to serve
before, and when facts are not as they should be the theory of how compe-
tition is supposed to work will be made to serve again.
I 22 Cf. Justice Stone, in Tyson v. Banton, supra note 5, at 451, 47 Sup. Ct.
at 442.
23 The creation of classes has had less attention than it deserves at the
*' hands of students of the court. Maitland gives a nice example of the
sixteenth century lawyer who created the "corporation sole" in an effort
,to get the King and the parson into the same class. See 3 MAITLAND, COL-
LEGCTED PAPERS (1911) 210.
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he belongs, why is the clan of brokers selected in preference to
a dozen others which includes him? If the question must turn
upon an exercise in classification, why does the basis of distinc-
tion lie in a mere mechanical stage of a marketing process,
which has nothing whatever to do witlf evils, regulation, or the
ends of governmental control? It is surprising to find Justice
Sutherland disposing of an issue in public policy by a purely
conceptual argument; it is disturbing to find the selection of
concepts resting upon nothing more basic than an arbitrary
choice.
In contrast, the opinion of Justice Stone is simple, clear-cut,
and direct. Since the issue is the validity of an act of regula-
tion by the state, he looks to see whether there was warrant
for the specific exercise of power. He is interested in such ques-
tions as, did evils exist, were they grave and persistent, was their
continuance likely to occasion serious consequences to the public,
was the action of the legislature reasonably intelligent, were the
particular measures taken addressed to the specific abuses to be
corrected. He makes a careful inquiry into the function of the
employment agency and a careful survey of its operation. He con-
cludes that while "there may be reasonable differences of opinion
as to the wisdom of the solution here attempted, -4 ... the choice
of a remedy.., should be left where, it seems to me, it was left
by, the Constitution-to the States and to Congress." He is quite
able to distinguish the Tyson case: "Ticket-brokers and labor
brokers are similar in name; in no other respect do they seem
alike to me. To overcharge a man for the privilege of hearing
the opera is one thing; to control the possibility of his earning a
livelihood would appear to be quite another." It is significant
that the precedents he cites are more numerous, more relevant,
and more compelling than those used by the spokesman for the
courlt.2 5 He sees the action of the legislature as a proper regula-
24 This concession is wholly rhetorical. There may abstractly be a bctter
remedy for existing abuses; but no alternative proposal of greater rele-
vancy, or of more certain legal validity is suggested anywhere in the
materials dealing with the case. If he had needed to do so, Justice Stone
might have made more of the ephemeral nature of the interest to which the
court accords protection, the ease with which business accommodates itself
to regulation, and the fly-by-night character of the general run of em-
ployment agencies. In fact if there is a "right" to be protected, it is tran-
sitory, while the evils which attend the lack of regulation are persistent.
25 Justice Sutherland stakes his argument upon the Tyson case, and makes
little use of other precedents. The case of Wolf Packing Co. v. Industrial
Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923), upon which he places some
reliance, hardly sustains the burden put upon it. Here Chief Justice Taft,
in his enumeration of classes of business affected with a public interest
includes, "Businesses which though not public at their inception may be
fairly said to have risen to be such." As his first example he ccts down
grain elevators, Mlunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); and Justice Stone
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tion designed to eliminate evils which are serious, disturbing to
the industrial system, and, if not corrected, persistent sources of
mischief. Throughout he seeks to place the larger above the
smaller value.
The position of the minority seems to be clearly in accord with
legal tradition. It is the swift onrush of industrial change
which has created alike the labor market and the need for its
regulation. From time out of mind the law has attempted to
prevent the unscrupulous from "trading upon a man's necessi-
ties." This solicitude has found expression in a maze of legisla-
tion of which the regulation of the rate of interest is a typical
example. For just as long the state has been an active agent in
the relief of the poor. Under modern industrial conditions the
dangers of necessity and of poverty lurk in new places. Where
the worker must take his labor that will not keep, to the market
and exchange it for a living, it is unemployment that is the great
source of poverty. If it is to be relieved in a constructive way the
state must take appropriate measures to see to it that the labor
market is so organized that the supply of jobs will go as far as
possible. And the man whose inability to bargain is rooted in
a lack of work needs protection from the job-broker as well as
from the money-lender. The regulatory power of the state, even
in late years, has by the courts repeatedly been held to extend
to objects of far less concern to the nation at large. The weight
of authority seems to be with the conservative position of Jus-
tice Stone. It seems to be squarely against the radical innova-
tions of Justice Sutherland and the majority of the court who
read into the Constitution of the United States the original ideas
of ingenious attorneys for plaintiffs-in-error.
seems to be right in insisting that the Ribnik case is more like the Munn
case than like the Tyson case. Aside from the California state cases al-
ready cited, the only other case which Justice Sutherland uses is the mini-
mum wage case, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct.
394 (1923).
In support of the proposition that "such regulation is within a state's
power whenever any combination of circumstances curtails the regulative
force of competition," Justice Stone cites the following cases upon the direct
fixing of prices. Munn v. Illinois, supra; Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391, 14
Sup. Ct. 857 (1894); German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S.
389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914); Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia,
241 U. S. 252, 36 Sup. Ct. 583 (1910); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41
Sup. Ct. 458 (1921) ; Marcus Brown Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 170, 41 Sup.
Ct. 465 (1921) ; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289
(1922). The following cases are cited upon the indirect fixing of prices.
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901) ; McLean
v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206 (1909); Mutual Loan Co. v.
Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (1911); Frisbie v. United States, 157
U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. 586 (1895). A critical review of the list is of course
impossible within the space limits here. But see supra note 21.
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It remains to be seen what the practical effect of this decision
will be. The power to grant licenses upon "reasonable condi-
tions" still remains with the states. The legislature of New Jer-
sey has already passed a new act attempting to get at the abuses
of labor exchanges by the use of this device 21 and other legisla-
tures will doubtless follow. It is doubtful whether private agen-
cies can be subdued to the useful and the good by such regula-
tory circumlocution. As yet the right of the state to establish
employment agencies in competition with private brokers is un-
questioned. Since these services are usually free, if they can
command patronage they may in time drive the private ex-
changes from the field. It would be interesting if the denial of
the power to supervise fees should result in the organization of
the labor market under a scheme of "state socialism."
But, whatever the future, the decision of the court leaves un-
settled the question of the kind of thing the Constitution is. Is it
a fetish which must be served whatever be the resulting inability
of the State to look after its own affairs? Is Justice Moody :-
right in declaring that it is not "a system of law sufficient for the
present moment which might in a few years become unsuited to
or inadequate for the needs of the people," but rather an instru-
ment of government "inspired and dominated" by "the spirit of
the nation-builder and not of the code-maker"?
W. H. H.
BANKRUPTCY OF LESSOR AS CREATING OPTION IN LESSEE TO
TERMINATE LEASE
By far the large majority of cases which consider the effect
of the bankruptcy of one of the palties to a lease involve claims
by lessors against lessees or their trustees in bankruptcy,
and consequently the results in certain situations are fairly
predictable. Thus, where there is a lease of realty, rent accru-
ing subsequent to the tenant's petition in bankruptcy is not a
claim provable against his estate I under the present Bankruptcy
Act, and recovery is limited to a personal action against the
bankrupt himself.2 But if the lease provides for acceleration
26 (1928) 18 Am. LABOR LEG. REv. 279.
27See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 4G3, 520, 28 Sup. Ct.
141, 154 (1908).
1 In re Mlle. Lemaud, Inc., 13 F. (2d) 208 (D. Mass. 192G). By § 63a of
the Bankruptcy Act, claims provable against the estate are those which are
"(1) a fixed liability... absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the
petion... whether payable or not ... (4) founded upon an open account,
or upon contract express or implied." 30 STAT. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C.
§ 103 (1927).
2n re Hook, 25 F. (2d) 493 (D. Md. 1928); cf. Kessler v. Slappey, 34
Ga. App. 614, 130 S. E. 921 (1925); 3 WmLLisoN, CONTRAcTS (1920) § 1935.
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of future rent in event of the lessee's bankruptcy, a claim for
that rent is provable.3 Where the lessor of realty is given a
statutory lien for future rent on goods upon the premises, it
has been held that bankruptcy does not destroy that lien.4 If
the lessor re-enters, under a provision for re-entry in the lease,
the tenancy is said to be terminated, and the bankrupt or his
trustee are. responsible neither for subsequent rent that would
otherwise have accrued,5 nor for any deficiency in the rent which
the lessor may suffer upon re-letting. Another type of claim
was recently illustrated in a North Carolina case, where a peti-
tion by a landlord for forfeiture of the lease and possession of
the premises held by an insolvent lessee corporation in the hands
of a receiver was denied on the ground that the receiver had
tendered all rent and costs to the landlord before judgment.'
The recent case of In re Civic Center Realty Co., 26 F. (2d)
825 (D. Md. 1928), however, raises a novel and more open ques-
tion. The Realty Company, as lessor of office space under a
five-year lease, was to effect certain alterations in the building,
and to assume the unfinished portion of the lessee's exist-
ing lease in another building with another party, the lease not
to be effective until completion of the alterations. While the
lease was entirely executory, the lessor was adjudicated an in-
voluntary bankrupt. Although the trustees asserted their
ability to carry out the agreement, the lessee petitioned for re-
lease, which was granted on the grounds of the uncertainty of
performance of the covenants by the lessor, and the injustice
of forcing the lessee to give up the premises it then occupied
and abide by the lease.
The lack of authority where the lessor becomes insolvent is
probably due to the fact that ordinarily a lessor's bankruptcy
would not cause a tenant of realty any apprehension or desire
to be relieved from the lease. Thus, while holding that the bank-
ruptcy of a tenant ipso facto terminates the relation of land-
lord and tenant,8 one court said by way of dictum: 9
3 Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919); Note (1910) 31
L. R. A. (N. s.) 270; cf. Note L. R. A. 1917F 657 (referring to articles on
different aspects of the subject).
4 Dove v. Davis, 25 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); Britton v. Western
Iowa Co., 9 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
5 Ex parte Houghton, Fed. Cas. No. 6,725 (D. Mass. 1871).
6 In re Shaffer, 124 Fed. 111 (D. Mass. 1903).
7 Coleman v. Carolina Theatres, Inc., 195 N. C. 607, 143 S. E. 7 (1928).
The decision was also based on statute. 1 N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919)
§§ 2343, 2372.
8 In re Hays, Foster & Ward Co., 117 Fed. 879 (D. Ky. 1902). This
decision is clearly the minority view on this point. See infra note 18.
9 *Ibid. 884.
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". .. different reasons would require a different result
in case a landlord should become bankrupt. In that case,
where the legal title to the real estate would devolve upon
the trustee in bankruptcy, and who would then be the sub-
stituted but temporary landlord by operation of law, the
land itself might be regarded as performing such duties to
the tenant as his needs required.... Change of ownership
of real estate never affects the rights of the tenant. It
is a matter with which, in normal cases, he has no concern."
Part of an able report "I by a Special Mlaster argues to the same
effect:
"Bankruptcy of a landlord would not ordinarily constitute
an anticipatory breach because his obligation in the lease
is not ordinarily one to pay or deliver something in the
future. He has already, by the lease, granted a term in
property."
The doctrine that where one party to an executory contract
puts it out of his own power to perform it, there is an anticipa-
tory breach giving the other party an immediate right of action
for damages, is generally accepted in the United States." In
applying this rule to the case of an insolvent corporation in the
hands of a receiver, it has been said that,
"Bankruptcy is a complete disablement from performance
and the equivalent of an out and out repudiation, subject
only to the right of the trustee, at his election, to rehabili-
tate the contract by performance." 12
This statement, however, would seem properly subject to a
limitation imposed in a similar case: "It is probable that bank-
ruptcy and insolvency do not break contracts when they do not
in fact prevent performance." 21 The landlord of a bankrupt
tenant is faced with the prospective failure of his principal and
often sole consideration-the payment of rent. But, as the as-
surance of occupation and the quiet enjoyment of the premises
will generally insure to the lessee substantial fulfilment of his
expectations under the lease,1'4 there is less justification for re-
garding the lessor's bankruptcy as an anticipatory breach.
However, the bankrupt lessor in the instant case had also
undertaken the supplementary covenants to assume the un-
lo See In re Bissinger Co., 5 F. (2d) 106, 112 (D. Ohio, 1925).
"ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 385; 3 WILLISTON, CONTMcTS
(1920) § 1314.
12 See In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57, 61 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); ef. also In re Svift,
112 Fed. 315 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901); In re Pettingill, 137 Fed. 143 (D. Mass.
1905).
13 See Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry., 198 Fed. 721, 743 (C. C. A.
2d, 1912).
'4 See supra notes 9 and 10.
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finished portion of the lessee's existing lease, and to effect cer-
tain alterations in the specified office space at a cost of some
$5,000. The court held that his bankruptcy rendered the per-
formance of these covenants so uncertain as to give the lessee
a proper claim for release. The decision was based on the case
of Central' Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association," in
which the Supreme Court held, in a case of an executory con-
tract for rights of baggage and livery service in a hotel, the
performance of which would require the use of capital by the
baggage company, that the bankruptcy of the latter constituted
an anticipatory breach, damages for which gave rise to a prov-
able claim against the bankrupt's estate. It would seem ques-
tionable whether, in view of the dissimilarity of the facts, the
instant court was justified in its .statement that while the Audi-
torium case "goes on the basis of an action for anticipatory
breach, the same principles which support that action operate
to give the lessee here the right to ask relief from his contract."
In the Auditorium case it was the "lessee" who was bankrupt.
The hotel company could plead prospective failure of the whole
consideration-the payment of rent. In the instant case, the
lessee has as a basis for his claim only the uncertainty of the per-
formance of certain supplementary covenants by the bankrupt
lessor. It would seem an established limitation of the rule as
to anticipatory breach that the repudiation must go to the en-
tire performance promised-must amount to a renunciation of
the entire consideration."6
Although the instant case involved a lease of realty, the court
ignored a dictum by the Supreme Court in the Auditorium case
to the effect that cases arising out of the relation of landlord
and tenant are distinguishable.7 There is a group of early cases
which assume that the relation of the parties to a lease of land
is severed by the bankruptcy of the lessee. 8 But this assump-
tion appears to have been definitely discarded.19 While the Audi-
15 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916), L. R. A. -1917B 580.
16 Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460 (1886) (lessee not privileged to
abandon the lease, where lessor announced his intention of not rebuilding as
he had agreed); see ANSON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 383 (b).
17Supra note 15, at 590, 36 Sup. Ct. at 414 (1916). Referring to a
number of landlord and tenant cases that had been cited, the court said,
"Cases of the latter class are distinguishable because of the 'diversity be-
tween duties which touch the realty, and the mere personalty'," citing
Co. LITT. 292b, § 513.
18 In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948 (D. Ky. 1899); Bray v. Cobb, 100 Fed. 270
(D. N. C. 1900); In re Hays, Foster & Ward Co., supra note 8; In re
Hinckel Brewing Co., 123 Fed. 942 (N. D. N. Y. 1903). For the argument
of these decisions see 48 Am. L. REG. 656 (1900).
19 See Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); In re
Ells, 98 Fed. 967, 968 (D. Mass. 1900); Witthaus v. Zimmerman, 91 App.
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torium case is generally taken to have definitely established the
principle that where capital is required for performance, banlk-
ruptcy is the equivalent of an anticipatory breach of an execu-
toiy lease of personalty,2° it left unsettled the application of
this principle to leases of realty.21 But subsequently in In re
Bissinger - the rule of the Azditorizoa case was held to apply
in both situations. Although the Bisshiger case arose on the
bankruptcy of the lessee, the suggestion that "if the landlord
perchance in a lease had agreed to rebuild or repair or do any-
thing involving financial outlay, his bankruptcy should be re-
garded as an anticipatory breach of that provision in the
lease," 23 would apply directly to the instant case. But the
situation was soon thrown into worse confusion by the subse-
quent reversal of the Bissbiger case on the grounds that under
the common law, which Ohio still followed in relation to leases,
the distinction between contracts relating to personalty and con-
tracts relating to realty, suggested in the Avditorehun case, still
emsts, and a claim for anticipatory breach of the latter is not
provable in bankruptcy. - The historical and technical basis
for this decision seems too rigid in the face of practical argu-
ments.2 5 However, that this distinction still persists in the
State courts as well, is evidenced by the recent Georgia case
of Kessler v. S14gppey in which, after a summary of the cases,
the court said:
"These cases and others seem to formulate the rule in
executory contracts pertaining to lease of realty, that not
only is the contract not terminated by bankruptcy, but that
a breach is not occasioned thereby, so as to give rise to
a claim provable in the bankruptcy court." 20
Div. 202, 204, 86 N. Y. Supp. 315, 317 (1st Dep't 1904) ; Liggett Co. v. Wil-
son 224 Mlass. 456, 458, 113 N. E. 184, 185 (1916). In the first of these
cases, Sanborn, J., remarked, "... throughout the entire field of contractual
obligations the adjudication in bankruptcy absolves from no agreement,
terminates no contract, and discharges no liability."
2 0 Note L. R. A. 1917B 585.
21,Supra note 17.
22Supra note 10. The practical arguments of the Special Blaster in this
case are undeniable.
23 Ibid. 112.
24 Wells v. Twenty-First Street Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6th,
1926). The court quoted from Gardiner v. Williams S. Butler & Co., 245
U. S. 603, 605, 38 Sup. Ct. 214 (1918): "But the law as to leases is not a
matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten
Lord Coke."
25 See (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 418.
26 Spra note 2, at 619, 130 S. E. at 924 (1925).
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Thus it may be seen that out of the dictum in the Auditorium
case a conflict has arisen which perhaps can be settled only
by further action by the Supreme Court. The instant case makes
no mention whatsoever of this conflict and apparently ignores
the limitations on the Auditorium case established by these sub-
sequent decisions.
Viewed from a practical standpoint, however, there would
seem to be a great deal of justification for the statement of
the instant court that "under all the circumstances ... it would
be unjust to force the [lessee] to vacate its present location
and abide by a lease which involves so much uncertainty." The
suit was brought a month after the lessee was to have been
given occupancy, and none of the alterations agreed upon had
even been begun. It was not improbable that the heat, light,
anal other service would be inadequate. The lessee was probably
not yet under any necessity of moving, as he still held his un-
expired lease, which the lessor had promised to assume. Further-
more, as the lease was to be operative only on completion of
the alterations, they would seem to have been regarded as of
vital importance by the lessee. From the lessee's standpoint,
a release from the agreement seems the only satisfactory solu-
tion.
. The termination of the lease, also, might be most advantageous
to the lessor. The trustees no doubt relied on the rule that
the trustee in bankruptcy may adopt the contractual obliga-
tions of the bankrupt.- The rent from the bankrupt's lessees
would be a valuable asset to the estate.2  But it seems more
conservative for the trustees to lease the property to other
parties, even for less rent, than to undertake such a substantial
outlay of labor and expense. Indeed, where additional capital
requirements are apparently necessary if the covenants in the
lease are to be performed, the court would seem to be justified
in refusing to rely on the trustee's assurance of their perform-
ance.
In giving a lessor 29 of personalty a provable claim in bank-
ruptcy for damages as for anticipatory breach, the Auditorium
case opened the way for the problem in the instant case.
Whether a lessor or lessee will need capital or credit faithfully
to perform his part of the lease in a particular case may be
27Watson v. Merrill, supra note 19; Ex parte Faxon, Fed. Cas. No. 4, 704
(C. C. D. Mass. 1869); cf. Notes (1902) 59 L. R. A. 673, II (a), (c); (1910)
33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 745. The Supreme Court in the Auditorium case held
bankruptcy to be a breach, but recognized that the trustee may adopt or
assign the lease. Supra note 15 at 590, 36 Sup. Ct. at 414.
28 Cf. 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) § 12 (7).
29 A diversity of agreements may be included by litigants or courts within
that elastic category of contracts called "leases."
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arguable. Once this is determined, however, the instant court
apparently seeks to provide a simple rule of administration-
namely, that it will not investigate the extent of the capital re-
quirements and the ability of the trustee to meet them, before
releasing the solvent party from the lease ---a rule which it
establishes as a corollary to that in the Auditorhu u case.
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN LEASE CONTROVERSIES
The declaratory judgment" has proven particularly effective
in avoiding the more cumbersome procedure of remedial litiga-
tion, where the interpretation of written instruments is involved.
The English Acts of 1850 and 1852,2 and the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Acts make specific provision for the exercise
of such power by the courts. A consideration of only those
cases 4 concerning lease controversies decided under these pro-
visions will indicate the broad extent of their application.
In one type of case, where the interest of the grantor in the
estate is contested by another claimant to title,! or seems defec-
so Assuming the correctness of this inference, query whether such a privi-
lege of abandonment would not carry with it a right to damages for antici-
patory breach under the Auditorium case.
I The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (U. S. 1928), assuming by way
of dictum that a proposed federal declaratory judgment act would be uncon-
stitutional is criticized in Comment (1928) 38 Y.= L. J. 104.
2 The first legislative authorization of the declaratory judgment in Eng-
land was the Act of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, § 1 (1850), which provided for the
submission by the persons interested in "the construction of any Act of
Parliament, Will, Deed or other instrument in wrTiting... for the opinion
of the said Court." This power was enlarged by the Act of 15 & 16 Vict.
c. 86, § 50 (1852), and the Supreme Court Rules of 18S3, 7 STAT. RUms
AND ORDERs 54. See Borchard, The Declaratory Judgincat-A Nccdcd
Procedural Reform (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 1, 27.
3 The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act provides in § 2 that "any pcrzon
interested ... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relation thereunder."
9 U. L. A. 87 (1923). Twenty-three states have adopted statutes of this
and other types providing for declaratory relief. Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. § 473;
Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 473. The federal statute has paszed the
House of Representatives and is now before a committee of the Senate.
- This discussion is confined to an examination of lease cases alone. A
detailed exposition of the desirability of declaratory judgments in all hinds
of controversies may be found in: Sunderland, A Modcrn Evolution iuz
Remedial Rights-The Declaratory J;dgm1 zcat (1917) 10 MxCn. L. Rcv. 09;
Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2; Kerr, Declarationzv of Rights TWithot. Con-
sequential Relief (1919) 53 An. L. Rsv. 161; Borchard, State Lcgislation
on Declaratory Judgments (1924) 18 At%. POL. Sci. REV. 305.
5 Raghubar v. Bhaikdhari, 3 Bengal L. R. App. 48 (1869) (action by
lessor to declare a purported lease void as against the lessor); Ram v.
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tive on its face,6 the power of the lessor to make the lease can
be settled by a declaratory judgment. Where this remedy is
not available the lessee has the choice, either of refusing to
take the lease, to the possible detriment of both parties, or of
taking the lease subject to the unknown risk of ejectment by
the claimant of the legal title.
In another type of case the declaratory judgment has served
to determine the lessee's disputed rights and privileges of user T
without the necessity of subsequent coercive relief.8.The broadest field for declaratory relief in lease controversies,
however, lies in the interpretation of express covenants in leases.
The numerous cases under this general head may be classified
according to the covenant sought to be interpreted.
Privilege of subletting. Where the lessee covenants not to
sublet without the permission of the lessor, such permission not
to be unreasonably withheld, and the lessor refuses his consent,
the most advantageous remedy is the declaratory judgment.0
Under the old procedure a right of damages for the unreason-
able refusal to permit subletting exists, but the lessee would
probably have to move out of the premises to maintain the
action advantageously. 10 It is unlikely, moreover, that the lessee
would have been able to sublet the premises without the land-
lord's consent, inasmuch as few tenants would care to subject
themselves to the risk of suit by the landlord. There would in
any case be considerable risk involved on the part of the lessee
if he sought to avail himself of the lessor's breach of covenant
by moving out of the premises and suing for damages. The con-
Rughoo, 1 Ind. L. R. 456 (1876) (action by lessee to declare interest granted
by lessor to third party void as against lease).
6 Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925) (one of the lessors
had merely a life estate in the property and had no power to make the
lease).
7Northern Pac. Lumber Co., Ltd. v. British American Trust Co., Ltd.,
23 Br. Col. 332 (1915) (extent of right to lumbering on leased land);
Consett Ind. & Prov. Soc., Ltd. v. Consett Iron Co., Ltd., [1922] 2 Ch. 135
(determining whether the lessee owed duty of subterranean support);
Taylor v. Br. Legal Life Assurance Co., Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 395 (whether a
right of way for pipes granted to lessee was subject to excessive user);
Lane Mortg. Co. v. Crenshaw, 269 Pac. 672 (Cal. 1928) (lessee's right
to manage property under lease agreement).
8 The court is not precluded in the declaratory proceedings from giving
coercive relief if the interested party demands it. It is frequently sus-
pended, however, in order to allow the parties to come to an arrangement.
Cf. Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries, Ltd., [1926] 1 Ch. 444. Or in view of
the difficulty in which the defendant would be placed if obliged to carry it
out immediately. Cf. Vestry of St. Mary, Islington v. Hornsey Urban Dist.
Council, [1900] 1 Ch. 695.
9 See Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 470, 205 N. Y. Supp. 760, 761
(Sup. Ct. 1924).
10 CA moDY, NEw YoRK PRACTICE (1923) § 304.
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fusion and loss which might result from such a procedure is
quite appreciable. 1  The declaratory judgment device, however,
renders this unnecessary. 2  The courts will allow the tenant
to sublet, where it is found that consent has been unreasonably
withheld,13 or at least will definitely settle the matter where
the objection of the lessor is valid.'4
Waste. In leases which provide that the penalty for commit-
ting waste is forfeiture of the term, the determination in ad-
vance whether certain conduct would constitute waste in
disputed cases preserves the lease and protects the parties.7
Coveinnt to insure. Where under the lease the lessee is called
TI The case of Broadway & 94th St., Inc. v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 116 Mizc.
440, 190 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Mun. Ct. 1921), is illustrative of the cumplexity
of the old procedure. There the lessee assigned to X without the landlord's
consent. X went into possession on the lessee's agreement that his poszsezion
would be undisputed for a period. The landlord gave the lessee notice that
the lease was terminated and rejected X as subtenant. He threatened to
turn off the steam and hot water, so that X vacated the premises. The
lessee then re-entered into possession but refused to pay rent. The landlord
brought summary proceedings to recover possession of the premises, and
the lessee counterclaimed for damages sustained through the landlord's
breach of covenant in refusing to give his consent to the subletting.
12 "It seems to me that it would be quite shocking if the court could not
put an end to the dispute in the way the learned judge has done by this
order... if the parties having come to court, the court were bound to say,
'Although we have the whole matter before us, and although we consider
the condition unreasonable, yet we cannot go any further and wie must
leave matters in this state, that the landlord may continue to abstain from
granting his license and the tenant must assign at his own risk-that is, at
the risk of forfeiture." Vaughan Williams, L. J., in Young v. Ashley
Gardens Prop., Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 112, 115.
"3Jenkins v. Price, [1907] 2 Ch. 229 (increase in rent demanded in re-
turn for consent); Young v. Ashley Gardens Prop., Ltd., oupra note 12 (on
condition of payment of increased taxes); West v. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 1,
semble; Evans v. Levy, [1910] 1 Ch. 452 (lessor demanded a binding cove-
nant by lessee to pay rent); Cornish v. Boles, 31 Ont. L. R. 505 (1914);
Mills v. Cannon Brewery Co., Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch. 3S (objection, intcr ali-,
on account of sublessee's nationality); In re Winfrey and Chattcrton's
Agreement, [1921] 2 Ch. 7 (landlord desired to occupy premises himrself);
Ideal Film Renting Co. v. Nielson, [1921] 1 Ch. 575 (objection that lessec
had formed a new company, which was in effect a new tenant of doubtiul
credit, inasmuch as "it had done ho business so far"); In re Gibbs and
Houlder Bros. & Co., Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 198 (landlord objected because
prospective subtenant was lessee of other premises belonging to the land-
lord, and he feared the loss of a desirable tenant).
4  Terrell v. Chatterton, [1922] 2 Ch. 647 (lessee sublet part of premices
without landlord's consent).
's Premier Dairies v. Garlick, [1920] 2 Ch. 17 (clause in lease prohibiting
removal of "all new and other buildings and erections" declared to include
fixtures erected by the tenant); London C. C. v. Hutter, [1925] 1 Ch. 626
(clause in lease that the tenant must not "cut or maim any of the principal
walls and timbers of the building" declared to prohibit fixing of an electric
sign to the outer walls of the building).
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upon to insure the premises, the question may arise as to whether
there has been a substantial compliance with the provision or
whether the lessor is entitled to reinsure at the lessee's expense.' 0
Obviously both parties are benefited if the question is deter-
mined without the necessity of reinsurance and a demand for
the amount of the premium paid by lessor on account of the
lessee.
Rebuilding destroyed premises. Covenants to repair frequently
fail to provide where the loss is to fall in unforeseen contingen-
cies. This may be determined by a declaration.1T So, also, the
rights of a lessor may be declared where he seeks to rebuild
premises destroyed, but the lessee denies that a building as is
proposed by the lessor, if constructed, will create a duty on his
part to pay rent."' The alternative under the old procedure is
either the termination of the lease with consequent loss of rent
to the lessor, or the necessity of actually erecting a building
in order to obtain a judicial construction of the lessor's and
lessee's respective positions.19
Covenant to pay taxes. Where the covenant is ambiguous or
so general as to include taxes which the lessee has grounds to
consider himself absolved from paying, the determination of his
duties in advance by the declaratory judgment 20 may avoid a
lessor's re-entry under the lease or a suit in quasi-contract, and
prevent the tying up of funds in the hands of one who is actually
under no duty to advance them.
Notice to quit. In order to be valid, a notice to quit must
be of such a character that the tenant can act on it with security.
He ought to be assured at the time he receives it and when he
is to act on it, that if he deliver up possession he will be acquitted
10 Tredegar v. Harwood, [1928] 1 Ch. 59, rev'd, 44 T. L. R. 790 (H. L.
1928).
17 Enlayde, Ltd. v. Roberts, [1917] 1 Ch. 109 (lessee paid for fire insura-
ance, while the lessor undertook to rebuild premises if destroyed by firo;
lessee responsible for all other repairs; declaration as to the responsibility
of lessor when premises were destroyed by enemy bomb).
18 Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 Atl. 506 (1928)
(while no express duty to rebuild, no rent could be collected unless premises
were rebuilt).
19Ibid. 525, 140 Atl. at 512.
20 McCrory Stores Corp. v. Braunstein, Inc., 102 N. J. L. 590, 134 Atl. 752
(1926) (whether agreement to* pay increase in taxes after Oct. 27, 1920
would cover the fiscal year 1919-20) ; Christy v. The Company, [1917] 1 Ch.
545 (whether receiver of lessee was entitled to deduct taxes in arrears paid
under threat of distress from the rent due) ; In re Salter and Awdry's Lease,
[1921] 2 Ch. 141 (whether landlord's obligation to pay 'rent charge' included
obligation to pay tithe rate) ; Busby v. Avgherino, [1927] 2 Ch. 33 (whether
the amount due on tithes should be determined by the customary payment
of the statute governing the amount to be paid), rev'd on other grounds,
[1928] 3 A. C. 290.
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of all further claims in respect to the remainder of the term.21
A declaratory judgment can give such assurance,-- while the old
procedure left both palties in doubt as to their rights until after
an action in ejectment by the lessor.
Option to purchase. The declaratory judgment is a convenient
method of ascertaining the legal position of a lessee claiming
an option to purchase, denied by the lessor, without waiting
for the time of performance to elapse. 3 Under the former pro-
cedure it would be necessary to tender the purchase price, de-
mand a deed and procure a refusal from the landlord to execute
the deed before the plaintiff could begin the action.2 4
Privilege to re-enter. Under the old procedure, where the
right to enter was denied by one in possession, a determination
of rights was obtained either by a trespass or an ejectment
proceeding. Declarations as to the rights of the parties,25 how-
ever, have avoided the damages and expense of these alternative
proceedings.
In all the above cases, under the old procedure, the plaintiff
would have had to take what has been well described as a step
in the dark involving either forfeiture of a lease, damages or
a loss of profitable user. By means of the simple procedure of
a suit for a declaratory juagment, the parties have been able
to narrow the issues, avoid irreparable breach of legal relations
attended by damages and consequent social and economic waste,
and at the same time to obtain a speedy and final judgment of
their respective rights under the lease.
21 See Right v. Cuthell, 5 East 491, 497 (1804).
22 Burch v. Farrows Bank, Ltd., [1917] 1 Ch. 606 (effect of a covenant to
deliver premises in repair upon proper notice); Tozer v. Viola, [1913] 1 Ch.
75 (effect upon the obligation of the assignor, original lessee of the premises,
of a wartime statute allowing the tenant on joining the army to quit);
Croft v. William F. Blay, Ltd., [1919] 2 Ch. 343 (declaration determining
the effect of a tenancy from year to year following upon a tenancy for a
term upon notice to quit); In re Bebington's Tenancy, [1921] 1 Ch. 559
(validity of notice to quit part of premises, followed by other notice to quit
the rest of the premises); Gray v. Spyer, [1922] 2 Ch. 22 (effect of option
of renewal upon notice to quit); Rochester and Chatham Joint Sewerage
Board v. Clin.ch, [1925] 1 Ch. 753 (effect of sale by one reversioner of part
of premises which lessee has been notified to quit).
2 3 In re Leeds and Batley Breweries, Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch. 548 (effect of
holding over from year to year upon option to purchase); Sherwood v.
Tucker, [1924] 2 Ch. 42 (effect of informal extension of the lease upon the
option); Batchelor v. Murphy, [1925] 1 Ch. 220 (effect of assignment of
leave upon the option).
2- Carmody, op. cit. supra note 10, § 304.
23 Civil Service Co-op. Soc., Ltd. v. Trustee of McGrigor, [1923] 2 Ch. 347




THE RELATION OF PATENTS AND ANTI-TRUST LAW
The basic assumption which obviously underlies anti-trust
legislation is that monopolies and combinations tending to pro-
duce monopoly conditions in an industry are not conducive to the
general welfare. This may not be true of all types of industry.
Indeed our laws recognize this fact and, at least to some extent,
except so-called "natural monopolies" from their operation.1 On
the whole, however, this fundamental assumption seems war-
ranted.2  At any rate, this country is committed to a policy of
suppressing monopoly, and maintaining an enforced competition."
Both the Federal Constitution, 4 and the Federal Congress,5 have
also created one field in which monopolies are expressly sanc-
tioned and authorized by law: the field of patents.
The Sherman Act makes monopolies and contracts in restraint
of trade illegal; 6 the patent law gives to the patentee the ex-
1 Reference is had here to the so-called "public service" industries, par-
ticularly in the field of transportation and municipal public utilities. These
probably function better as controlled monopolies. Moreover in these lines
of production monopoly is inevitable. 2 TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
(3d ed. 1921) 116, 117; 2 FAIRCHILD, FURNISS AND BUCK, ELEMENTAMu
ECONOMICS (1926) 68.
Municipal public utilities are largely intrastate and, for this reason if
for no other, do not fall within the operation of the federal laws. The
Transportation Act [41 STAT. 482 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (4), (5) (1928)]
looks to the ultimate consolidation of railroads into a limited number of
systems, even if this should involve some elimination of competition. VAN-
DERBLUE AND BURGEss, RAILROADS (1923) 410; see Lease of Valley Terminal
Railway, 65 I. C. C. 105, 109 (1920).
2 "As to combination, we concluded that, while there is undoubtedly some
opportunity here for saving in cost of production, the true economy from
combination of separate business units is neither universal nor very great.
On the contrary, it appeared that the motive for combination and the ex-
planation of its most conspicuous successes was generally the possession
of monopoly powers." 2 FAIRCHILD, FURNISS AND BUCK, Op. Cit. upra note
1, at 46; see also TAusSIG, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 15.
3 Anti-trust legislation is fairly general among the states. See for ex-
ample: N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 21, §§ 340-346; ILL. REv. STAT.
(Cahill, 1927) c. 38, §§ 598-605; VA. GEN. LAws (1923) § 4722. The most
important federal acts are the so-called Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890),
15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2, 3 (1927), and the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1J14),
as amended May 15, 1916, and May 26, 1920, 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1927).
4 U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have power . . .
to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Writings and
Discoveries."
5 16 STAT. 201 (1870), 35 U. S. C. § 40 (1928) provides: "Every patent
shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the
term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the
invention . . . throughout the United States . . ."
6 Supra note 3. The Sherman Act provides: "Section 1. Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
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elusive right to make, use, and sell the patented device or com-
modity.7 The patentee may grant or assign this exclusive right,
or he may license others to share it with him, in part or in whole.
License agreements frequently contain restrictions either as to
the resale price, the use of the patented article, or as to other
conduct of the licensee. And these restrictions are often im-
posed where no license agreement can be said to exist
It used to be a common practice for manufacturers of patented
articles to put a label on them restricting the vendee to using
them only with certain unpatented products of the patentee. In
the famous Button-Fastener case 8 such a restriction was upheld,
and the violation of it enjoined as patent infringement. The
theory of the decision seems to be that since the patentee has the
exclusive right to make, vend, or use the article, he may assigA
part of his right on any terms he chooses. The fact that the
manufacturer's monopoly is thus extended to unpatented articles
is defended on the ground that "the monopoly in the unpatented
staples results as an incident from the monopoly in the use of
the plaintiff's invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of
the plaintiff's control over the use of his invention by others." 0
The rule in this case was followed by the lower federal courts in
other circuits and was finally adopted by the Supreme Court in
1912.10 In Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Films Co.,U
hereby declared to be illegal . . . (violation declared a misdemeanor and
punishment provided).
"Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.. 21
Supra, note 5. For a discussion of whether there is conffict between
patent and anti-trust legislation, see Peaslee, The Effect of the Fcdcral
"Anti-Trvst Laws" on Commerce in Patented and Copyrightcd Articl
(1915) 28 HAnv. L. REv. 394; Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Laws to
the Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1927) 12 CON. L. Q. 261; Podell and
Kirsch, Patent Pools and the Anti-Tnst Laws (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 430;
Workman, Patent Pools in Relation to Patent Laws (1927) 13 A. B. A. 3.
585.
sHeaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
9 Ibid. 296.
10 Cortelyou v. Lowe, 111 Fed. 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901); Broderich Copy-
graph Co. v. Roper, 124 Fed. 1019 (D. R. I. 1903); Henry v. A. B. Dic:
Co., 224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364 (1912). The opinion in the Dich cae vas
written by Justice Lurton who as circuit judge had written the opinion in
the Button-Fastener case. For discussion of the Dic: case, see Montague,
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Law (1912) 21 YAL= L. 3.
433; Abbott, Patents and the Sherman Act (1912) 12 COL. L. Rar. 709;
Chamberlain, Patented Articles; When are they Emancipatcd from the
Patent Monopoly -nder which They are Manufactured? (1912) 6 ILL. L.
REv. 357.
2 1243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416 (1917). The Court said, "the enclusive
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decided in 1917, the court reversed itself, holding that such a
restriction on the use of a patented article was invalid, when the
article had been sold. Restrictions on the use of a patented ma-
chine by the vendee have not, however, been entirely abolished. 13
Attempts to maintain the resale price of an article have been fre-
quent and have met with varying success. Where the manufac-
turer sells the article he cannot restrict its resale price by a
label, any more than he can so restrict its use.13 Here, too, the
article is deemed to be emancipated from the patent monopoly by
a sale.1 4 In fact, an express agreement between vendor and ven-
dee that the latter shall maintain the resale price is held to be
illegal.1 There is nothing illegal, however, in suggesting a re-
tail price, and refusing to deal with those who do not maintain
it.,' And an express stipulation is valid where the transaction
between the parties is found to be one of agency rather than one
of sale.Y7
right granted in every patent must be limited to the invention . . . and
it is not competent for the owner of the patent . . . to . . . extend the
scope of its patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials neces-
sary in its operation but which are no part of the patented invention."
Ibid. 516, 37 Sup. Ct. at 420. Justice Holmes dissented, adopting the
laissez-faire reasoning of the Dick case, supra note 10.
12 Ideal Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Geo. Close Co., 23 F. (2d) 848 (D. Mass.
1928) (vendee of candy-wrapping machine is not privileged to violate a
stipulation that he will not alter the machine so as to enable it to make
candy of a different size).
'2 This is true now whether the article be patented or unpatented. Bauer
& Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) (patented); Dr,
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct.
376 (1911) (unpatented). Formerly a patentee could maintain resale
prices in this way. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424
(C. C. A. 7th, 1903); The Fair v. Dover Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 117 (C. C. A.
7th, 1908). But not the manufacturers of unpatented articles. John D.
Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) (decided
expressly on the ground that the article was unpatented).
1' Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, stupra note 13, at 10, 33 Sup. Ct. at 620.
3z United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251
(1920); Allen v. Parks, 196 Iowa 943, 195 N. W. 745 (1923); (1924) 10
VA. L. REv. 483.
10 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465 (1919);
Landauer v. Bard-Parker Co., 125 Misc. 461, 210 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup.
Ct 1925).
' 7United States v. Gen. Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192
(1926). In this case, according to the contract between the defendant and
wholesale and retail dealers, the dealers were to sell on a commission basis
the electric light bulbs which were consigned to them by the defendant,
transportation prepaid. The sales were to be at fixed prices and by the
defendant. The dealers were required to pay all expenses except the orig-
inal transportation. Unsold lamps were to be returned. The dealers ac-
counted monthly for the proceeds and had to pay for all lost or missing
lamps. The defendant in fact carried all other risks, including insurance.
What the parties label the transaction will not be controlling and dovia-
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Where the licensee of patented machinery is a lessee thereof,
"tying clauses," or agreements in the contract of lease binding
the lessee in effect to use all or none of a line of machinery pro-
duced by the lessor, were at one time enforced by the courts. 2
Under the Clayton Act of 1914,10 however, "tying clauses" are
now illegal .2
It occurs not infrequently that owners of interfering, comple-
mentary, or competing patents pool their patents, and license
each other to use them. This may be accomplished by a cross-
licensing agreement,2 1 and probably such an agreement would
not be illegal..2 2 Where it is coupled with an agreement to main-
tain prices, limit output and pool profits, however, such cross-
licensing is within the prohibition of the anti-trust laws.-3
Another method of pooling patents is to assign them to an indi-
vidual or corporation, which in turn licenses the contracting par-
ties to manufacture the patented article, or use the patented
process.2 - Sometimes a corporation acquires a monopoly or a
tions from the facts in the General Electric case may easily be deemed to
constitute the transaction a sale. Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. J. D. Parh
& Sons Co., svpra note 13; Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 225
Fed. 373 (S. D. Ohio 1914), affd, 244 Fed. 156 (C. C. A. 0th, 1917).
In these cases the status of the dealer is interesting and relatively novel.
For what purposes is he to be treated as an agent, and for what others as
an independent entrepreneur? The legal incidents of his status do not
seem to have been fully worked out as yet.
'Is United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473
(1918). But cf. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. LaChapelle, 212 Mass. 467, 99
N. E. 289 (1912).
1OSupra note 3: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract
for sale of goods . . . whether patented or unpatented, for use, con3ump-
tion or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not uze or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . or the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale ... may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
20 United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. "63
(1922) (holding Clayton Act constitutional); Opinion of the Justices, 193
Mass. 605, 81 N. E. 142 (1907). For an appraisal of the legal effect of the
Clayton Act, see Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 7.
21 For example, Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 160 Fed. 555
(D. Mass. 1909); Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 90 Cal. 510,
31 Pac. 581 (1892).
22 Lamb, op. cit. supra note 7, at 279.
23 Cases, supra note 21. In the Powder Co. case there was also a restric-
tion as to territory to be operated in.
24 The National Harrow Co. is an example. Nat. Harrow Co. v. Quick,
67 Fed. 130 (D. Ind. 1895); Nat. Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 30 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1897); Bement v. Nat. Harrow Co., 180 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747
(1902). The "Bath Tub" Trust also illustrates this point. United States
v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 172 (D. DId. 1911), aff'd, 220 U.
S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912).
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substantial number of the patents in an industry by producing
its own inventions.25  The courts apparently treat license agree-
ments similarly in both types of cases. If they are accompanied
by no restrictions save the payment of royalties they are valid.',
Agreements which require the licensed manufacturers to main-
tain fixed prices have also been enforced. 27  A stipulation that
the licensee will use only products of the licensor in making the
patented device has been upheld. 28 On the other hand where the
record clearly shows that the patentee and licensees control most
of the output in the restricted line, such agreements are apt to
be considered as violating the anti-trust laws.29
Any criticism of cases in this field should, it is believed, take
into consideration the ends sought by our patent system, for in
the last analysis the primary function of the law here is to fur-
ther these ends. The system seeks to reward the inventor, en-
courage invention, and procure inventions for the use of the
public.30 To accomplish this it creates a monopoly, and obliges
25 This was true of the American Tobacco Co., the Eastman Kodak Co.,
and the Radio Corporation of America. See 1 REPORT OF COIMMISSIONER OF
CORPORATIONS ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (1909) 66, 67, 84; cf. United
States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W. D. N. Y. 1915); FDERAT.
TRADE COMMISSION, RADIO INDUSTRY (1923) 1-4; Indiana M Ifg. Co. v. 3.
I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 154 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907).
26 Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 71 Fed. 302 (E. D. Mo. 1895).
27 Bement v. Nat. Harrow Co., supra note 24; Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v.
Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); Massie
v. Asbestos Brake Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 298, 123 Atl. 155 (1923); (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 1142.
Is Westinghouse Elect. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268 Fed. 121 (D.
.Del. 1920); cf. U. S. Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 126
Fed. 364 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903) *(contract upheld under which licensees wero
to use only licensed machines, were to deal with no raisins produced by un-
licensed machines, etc.). These decisions seem to go rather far and will
not, perhaps, be followed.
29 In the Bement case, supra note 24, only the contract between the
licensor and one licensee was before the court. In the other Harrow cases
a different result was reached, the monopolistic scheme appearing of rec-
ord. The "Bathtub" Trust, controlling 78% of the output of enamelled
ware and 80% of the jobbers in that line, was held illegal. The license
agreement here also fixed prices. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United
States, supra note 24. Where the Radio Corporation, controlling 70% of
the supply of vacuum tubes, licensed manufacturers to make receiving sets
under its patents, the licensees agreeing to purchase all tubes used in said
sets from the Corporation, the contract was held to be within the Sher-
man Act. Lord v. Radio Corporation of America, 24 F. (2d) 565 (D. Del.
1928). It has been suggested that if the license agreement is only a rea-
sonable method of protecting the patent monopoly, it will be upheld; but
otherwise if it seeks to go beyond what is necessary for such protection.
Toulmin, The Patent Law and the Sherman Law (1914) 1 VA. L. REV. 445;
cf. Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra note 21, at 559.
0 U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8; supra note 5; VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR
PATENT SYSTEM (1925) 27 et seq.
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the immediate disclosure of the patented device, as well as a
grant of the invention to the public at the expiration of seven-
teen years. The monopoly is not created for the benefits that it
will confer directly upon society. On the contrary by hypothesis,
monopoly is of itself undesirable, and is to be regarded as part
of the social cost of the patent system. And as a result it surely
follows that the patent monopoly should be restricted as much
as is consistent with encouragement of inventions. What, then,
is the effect on invention of encouraging an extension of the
patent monopolies? Very few inventor-patentees manufacture
their own inventions.2 Professor Vaughan in a recent book on
the Economics of our Patent System states that the system at
present tends to discourage inventors.22 The benefits of monop-
oly which are intended to accrue to the inventor, encourage and
reward him, seem frequently to take quite a different course un-
der modern conditions. Combinations and pools have not, how-
ever, resulted in unmitigated evil from the social point of view.
Often enough the motive for their formation has been to settle
differences and end litigation between patentees with conflicting
claims.23 Litigation -in this field is slow and costly, and its
elimination represents a saving to society. Then, too, a product
which embodies all the best appropriate patents will be more effi-
cient than one embodying only some of them. Moreover, such
combination of resources is conducive to more extensive research
and development. For instance, there is some doubt as to
whether radio instruments could be as perfected as they are in
the absence of a combination of radio patents.24 Perhaps it is
31 H. R. REP., OLDFIELD HEARINGS BEFORE THE COTI' .nTTEE ON PITMTS
(1912) No. 10, pp. 19-20; No. 4, p. 11.
32 VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 30, c. S. Professor Vaughan lists seven
reasons for this: (1) the fact that some inventions are simply not of prac-
tical value; (2) the monopolistic character of patent rights. This discour-
ages inventors by giving the holder of a basic patent a great advantage in
bargaining power over the inventor of an improvement thereon, since no
one but the basic patentee will be able to use the invention. .,Ioreover,
patent trusts are frequently the only possible buyers of any patents along
the line in which they are interested, for a similar reason. (3) Unfair
competition, the author includes in this category the activities of the A. B.
Dick Co., and The Motion Picture Patent Co.; (4) The fact that under
the present system the holder of a patent need not exploit it. A patentee
may prosecute an action for infringement although he makes no use of the
patent himself. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210
U. S. 405, 28 Sup. Ct. 748 (190); (5) Lack of capital by the inventor;
(6) The nature of invention itself; (7) The characteristics of inventor-.
33 This was one of the reasons for combination in the National Harrow
Co. cases, supra note 24. For other examples see U. S. Consol. Seeded
Raisin Co. v. Griffin & Skelley Co., s'upra note 28; Massie v. Asbestos Brake
Co., supra note 27.
34 FEDERAL TRADE C0ixissroN, RADIO INDUSTRY (1923) 24 et scq.
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not desirable that science should be thus left to industry,31 but
we must give industry its just due for its contributions. On
the other hand Justice Brandeis has pointed out that these great
organizations have generally proved unprogressive.30
Probably more good than harm flows from unrestricted cross-
licensing. Laissez-faire under modern conditions apparently
tends to discourage the individual inventor and encourage the
formation of combinations and monopolies. But these may main-
tain a supply of inventions from their own laboratories. It is
probably very questionable that the influence of the law on the
number of inventions will be very great in either event. There-
fore, our declared policy of suppressing monopolies and main-
taining enforced competition should, it is submitted, govern in
these cases.
35 See the remarks of the Graduate Dean of Brown University, BULLETIN
OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, REPORT OF PRESIDENT OF CORPORATION (1022) 33, 34.
86 Op. cit. supra note 31, No. 18, p. 12.
